To evaluate the threat posed by terrorism, we compiled a data set of 893 incidents that occurred in the United States between January 1994 and May 8, 2020.9 (The link to the methodology can be found at the end of the brief.) These incidents included both attacks and foiled plots. We coded the ideology of the perpetrators into one of five categories: ethnonationalist, left-wing, religious, right-wing, and other (which included motivations that did not fit into any of the categories). All of the religious attacks and plots in the CSIS data set were committed by terrorists who ascribed to a Salafi-jihadist ideology.This section analyzes the data in two parts: terrorist incidents and fatalities. The data show three notable trends. First, right-wing attacks and plots accounted for the majority of all terrorist incidents in the United States since 1994. In particular, they made up a large percentage of incidents in the 1990s and 2010s. Second, the total number of right-wing attacks and plots has grown substantially during the past six years. In 2019, for example, right-wing extremists perpetrated nearly two-thirds of the terrorist attacks and plots in the United States, and they committed over 90 percent of the attacks and plots between January 1 and May 8, 2020. Third, although religious extremists were responsible for the most fatalities because of the 9/11 attacks, right-wing perpetrators were responsible for more than half of all annual fatalities in 14 of the 21 years during which fatal attacks occurred.
This volume seeks to provide a single, unified, relatively comprehensive, repository of information on jihadist terrorism by offering three sets of integrated essay on, firstly, four key jihadist terrorist organisations, (AQ, IS, Hamas and Lashkar-e-Taiba), secondly, four zones of armed conflict involving these terrorist groups, (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Israel-Palestine), and, thirdly, the counter-terrorist responses of five key liberal democratic states, (US, UK, France, India and Israel). The resulting reference work is one suitable for use by researchers and students in terrorism studies, by policymakers, security personnel and others requiring, in particular, a comparative knowledge of counter-terrorism measures across a range of liberal democracies, and by journalists, members of the educated public and others desiring to possess a general understanding of jihadist terrorism and what is being done to combat it.
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Many governments5 and international bodies6 treat terrorists, particularly Islamist terrorists, like members of other criminal associations7. Although the interest in studying violent extremism and radicalization is a global ambition, in addition to difficulty accessing samples of terrorists, gaps in the current research literature arguably require more focused investigation, particularly regarding the characterization of terrorist violence as criminal behavior. For example: (1) although research suggests that terrorist offenders can have much in common with criminal offenders when it comes to risk factors8, there may be a significant overestimation of the similarity between Islamist terrorism and gang behavior; (2) empirical data is still seriously lacking in regard to claims about the similarities and differences between jihadist and non-jihadist criminal groups in terms of the psychosocial factors that motivate their respective behaviors8,9, and particularly what may affect recidivism10,11; (3) there has been scant attempt to undertake direct comparative field research, or to coordinate and synthesize qualitative and quantitative data; and (4) the comparative role played by psychosocial factors has been under-researched9. What follows is intended to help fill these gaps.
A final caveat: It is possible that the age differences between prisoner groups, with jihadists being on average more than 8 years older than gang members, may render gang members less susceptible than jihadists to political awareness and militancy. Differences in age may also suggest pre-prison prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts attuned to different moments and activities in the life course59: for example, youth in a transitional stage of life, having left their genetic family to seek new associations of friends and fellow travelers, versus a more mature stage in life that may favor a return to traditional religion and family.
On a policy level, these findings also have potentially important ramifications for the penitentiary system and society-at-large that could help to forestall recidivism, and to disengage from radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism more generally. The scope of the present study is restricted to Islamist terrorists, or jihadists, and as such cannot directly speak to other forms of subnational, national and transnational terrorism, such as the resurgence of extreme right wing and racial supremacist violence. Nevertheless, recent comparative analyses of ethno-nationalist and Islamist terrorism note important convergences with regard to key variables examined in the present study (devotion to group identity and ideological values, perceived injustice and discrimination), which likely render our findings relevant for wider comparative studies of terrorism and its relation to criminality14,24,25,26.A broader implication, and guiding principle, of our study was to show that a strong theoretical approach to pressing and tenacious real-world threats, such as a pervasive form of transnational terrorism, in ecologically valid field conditions, may help scientists and policymakers to come together in understanding how to mitigate such threats in the long term as well as in the here and now.
Correlational analyses were used to examine the relation between critical variables for the full sample as well as independently for each of the four prisoner groups. Univariate analyses were conducted to examine the differences on each variable for each of the four groups. Univariate instead of multivariate analyses were conducted because not all participants responded to all the questions, thus reducing the sample from a full comparison; nevertheless, alternative multivariate analyses yielded the same conclusions.
No contemporary figure is more demonized than the Islamist foreign fighter who wages jihad around the world. Spreading violence, disregarding national borders, and rejecting secular norms, so-called jihadists seem opposed to universalism itself. In a radical departure from conventional wisdom on the topic, The Universal Enemy argues that transnational jihadists are engaged in their own form of universalism: these fighters struggle to realize an Islamist vision directed at all of humanity, transcending racial and cultural difference.
Anthropologist and attorney Darryl Li reconceptualizes jihad as armed transnational solidarity under conditions of American empire, revisiting a pivotal moment after the Cold War when ethnic cleansing in the Balkans dominated global headlines. Muslim volunteers came from distant lands to fight in Bosnia-Herzegovina alongside their co-religionists, offering themselves as an alternative to the US-led international community. Li highlights the parallels and overlaps between transnational jihads and other universalisms such as the War on Terror, United Nations peacekeeping, and socialist Non-Alignment. Developed from more than a decade of research with former fighters in a half-dozen countries, The Universal Enemy explores the relationship between jihad and American empire to shed critical light on both.
In terms of geographic distribution within Australia, 10 Islamist terrorism cases so far have involved individuals based in Sydney (two of whom relocated to Perth); four have involved individuals based in Melbourne; and two cases involved individuals from Adelaide. Six cases (16 individuals) have involved a focus on carrying out domestic attacks, although only three of these have presented a credible threat (see below). Thus, more cases have involved attempts to go overseas for violent jihad, but more individuals have been involved in domestic terrorist activity since these have involved larger groups.
Links to FTOs among Australian Islamist terrorism cases have been present in 14 of 16 cases (88%). The comparative percentages for cases in the US and the UK are 50% and 43%, respectively, between 2001 and 2008[7] and although it is surprising that the Australian rate is higher, it is a matter of the low numbers involved. Australians have been linked to the following FTOs: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish e-Mohammed (JeM), the Peninsula Lions in Kuwait, Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, and al-Shabab in Somalia.
Some scientific studies have compared terrorist dynamics with those applied in cults, highlighting certain similarities between the two. Trujillo et al. (24) evaluated the psychological manipulation processes that take place within terrorist groups, showing the use of these dynamics by certain leaders. According to Cuevas (44), terrorist and cultist dynamics are nearly identical, with the only difference being the use of fear and violence by terrorist groups as a means of self-assertion. In any case, the possibility that terrorist groups use this type of technique has not been studied in detail. 2ff7e9595c
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